Bernstein, however, notes that Bard later denied that he had a meeting with Truman and that White House appointment logs support that claim. By James Rothwell 5 October 2022 7:25am. Colonel John Stone, an assistant to commanding General of the Army Air Forces Henry H. Hap Arnold, had just returned from Potsdam and updated his boss on the plans as they had developed. [80]. The first bomb was dropped on Hiroshima at 8:15 AM on August 6th, and the second bomb was dropped over Nagasaki on August 9th at 11:02 AM. While Lincoln believed that the proposed peace teams were militarily acceptable he doubted that they were workable or that they could check Soviet expansion which he saw as an inescapable result of World War II. In this memorandum, Norstad reviewed the complex requirements for preparing B-29s and their crew for successful nuclear strikes. The day after he told Sato about the current thinking on Soviet mediation, Togo requested the Ambassador to see Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov and tell him of the Emperors private intention to send Prince Konoye as a Special Envoy to Moscow. Along with the ethical issues involved in the use of atomic and other mass casualty weapons, why the bombs were dropped in the first place has been the subject of sometimes heated debate.As with all events in human history, interpretations vary and readings of primary sources can lead to different conclusions. Soviet aircraft had bombed Changchun and Harbin by darkness. The material reproduced here gives a sense of the state of play of Foreign Minister Togos attempt to secure Soviet mediation. That possibility would be difficult if the United States made first military use of the weapon. Hasegawa cited it and other documents to make a larger point about the inability of the Japanese government to agree on concrete proposals to negotiate an end to the war. Why were alternatives not pursued? See also Walker (2005), 316-317. Concerned that President Roosevelt had an overly cavalier belief about the possibility of maintaining a post-war Anglo-American atomic monopoly, Bush and Conant recognized the limits of secrecy and wanted to disabuse senior officials of the notion that an atomic monopoly was possible. For the inception of the Soviet nuclear program and the role of espionage in facilitating it, see Holloway,Stalin and the Bomb(New Haven, Yale University Press, 1994). This memorandum from General Groves to General Marshall captured how far the Manhattan Project had come in less than two years since Bushs December 1942 report to President Roosevelt. [30]. Nor is it an attempt to substitute for the extraordinary rich literature on the atomic bombings and the end of World War II. Barton J. Bernstein and Martin Sherwin have argued that if top Washington policymakers had kept tight control of the delivery of the bomb instead of delegating it to Groves the attack on Nagasaki could have been avoided. The combination of the first bomb and the Soviet declaration of war would have been enough to induce Tokyos surrender. On the August 6, 1945, the world's first atomic bomb was dropped on the Japanese city of Hiroshima, by the United States. According to a Joint Chiefs of Staff report on Japanese target systems, expected results from the bombing campaign included: The absorption of man-hours in repair and relief; the dislocation of labor by casualty; the interruption of public services necessary to production, and above all the destruction of factories engaged in war industry. While Stimson would later raise questions about the bombing of Japanese cities, he was largely disengaged from the details (as he was with atomic targeting). When the Foreign Minister met with the Emperor, Hirohito agreed with him; he declared that the top priority was an early end to the war, although it would be acceptable to seek better surrender terms--probably U.S. acceptance of a figure-head emperor--if it did not interfere with that goal. Brown Papers, box 68, folder 13, Transcript/Draft B, Returning from the Potsdam Conference, sailing on the U.S.S. Alperovitz, however, treats it as additional evidence that strongly suggests that Truman saw alternatives to using the bomb. Also included, to give a wider perspective, were translations of Japanese documents not widely available before. Therefore, we are publishing an excised version of the entry, with a link to the Byrnes note. The documents may even provoke new questions. With more information on the Alamogordo test available, Groves provided Marshall with detail on the destructive power of atomic weapons. In the course of the conversation, Harriman received a message from Washington that included the proposed U.S. reply and a request for Soviet support of the reply. An importanton-line collection focuses on the air-raids of Japanese cities and bases, providing valuable context for the atomic attacks. Some months later, with the Manhattan Project already underway and under the direction of General Leslie Grove, Bush outlined to Roosevelt the effort necessary to produce six fission bombs. and offer details on potential protection (protective clothing against a uranium bomb includes rubber and any kind of insulation against electricity). The first Japanese surrender offer was intercepted shortly before Tokyo broadcast it. When he learned of the atomic bombing from the Domei News Agency, Togo believed that it was time to give up and advised the cabinet that the atomic attack provided the occasion for Japan to surrender on the basis of the Potsdam Declaration. I am lost! With the devastating battle for Okinawa winding up, Truman and the Joint Chiefs stepped back and considered what it would take to secure Japans surrender. Moreover, the atrocities of the bombs were not made graphically public to the Japanese people until August 6, 1952, when Asahi Graphpublished the issue titled Genbaku higai no shokkai (the first publication of the damages of the atomic bomb). . Tagaki was soon at the center of a cabal of Japanese defense officials, civil servants, and academics, which concluded that, in the end, the emperor would have to impose his decision on the military and the government. Takagi kept a detailed account of his activities, part of which was in diary form, the other part of which he kept on index cards. Gaimusho [Ministry of Foreign Affairs], ed., Shusen Shiroku [Historical Record of the End of the War] (Tokyo: Hokuyosha, 1977-1978), vol. With Japan close to capitulation, Truman asserted presidential control and ordered a halt to atomic bombings. This update presents previously unpublished material and translations of difficult-to-find records. 816-268-8200 | 800-833-1225 Magic summaries for post-August 1945 remain classified at the National Security Agency. Within a few days Japan surrendered, and the terrible struggle that we call World War II was over. Consistent with his earlier attempts, Stimson encouraged Truman to find ways to expedite Japans surrender by using kindness and tact and not treating them in the same way as the Germans. The bomb was dropped to impress the Soviets, and persuade them to relax their grip on eastern Europe. With direct access to the documents, readers may develop their own answers to the questions raised above. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 306-NT). [53], RG 457, Summaries of Intercepted Japanese Messages (Magic Far East Summary, March 20, 1942 October 2, 1945), box 7, SRS 491-547, This Far East Summary included reports on the Japanese Armys plans to disperse fuel stocks to reduce vulnerability to bombing attacks, the text of a directive by the commander of naval forces on Operation Homeland, the preparations and planning to repel a U.S. invasion of Honshu, and the specific identification of army divisions located in, or moving into, Kyushu. For Groves and the problem of radiation sickness, see Norris, 339-441, Bernstein, Reconsidering the Atomic General: Leslie R. Groves,Journal of Military History67 (2003), 907-908, and Malloy, A Very Pleasant Way to Die, 513-518 and 539-542. [54], This summary included several intercepted messages from Sato, who conveyed his despair and exasperation over what he saw as Tokyos inability to develop terms for ending the war: [I]f the Government and the Military dilly-dally in bringing this resolution to fruition, then all Japan will be reduced to ashes. Sato remained skeptical that the Soviets would have any interest in discussions with Tokyo: it is absolutely unthinkable that Russia would ignore the Three Power Proclamation and then engage in conversations with our special envoy., Documents 60A-D: These messages convey the process of creating and transmitting the execution order to bomb Hiroshima. We wish to believe. When former Secretary of State Cordell Hull learned about it he outlined his objections to Byrnes, arguing that it might be better to wait the climax of allied bombing and Russias entry into the war. Byrnes was already inclined to reject that part of the draft, but Hulls argument may have reinforced his decision. Upper image - July 24, 1945, photo by 28th Photo Reconnaissance Squadron Also necessary for those capabilities was the production of a nuclear chain reaction. Background on the U. S. Atomic Project, III. Historian believed that there are two different possibilities. The Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, brought the United States officially into World War II. The 75th anniversary of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 is an occasion for sober reflection. The atomic bomb is the subject of much controversy. Taking the Americans by surprise, the Japanese planes destroyed or damaged 18 ships . A directive (right), written by Leslie Groves , approved by President Truman, and issued by Secretary of War Henry Stimson and General of the . The target would be a city--either Hiroshima, Kyoto (still on the list), or Niigata--but specific aiming points would not be specified at that time nor would industrial pin point targets because they were likely to be on the fringes a city. This latest iteration of the collection includes corrections, a few minor revisions, and updated footnotes to take into account recently published secondary literature. They also discussed postwar legislation on the atom and the pending Henry D. Smyth report on the scientific work underlying the Manhattan project and postwar domestic controls of the atom. In what Stimson called the letter of an honest man, Oswald C. Brewster sent President Truman a profound analysis of the danger and unfeasibility of a U.S. atomic monopoly. The United States, then, dropped the bombs to end the war that Japan had unleashed in Asia in 1931 and extended to the United States at Pearl Harborand thereby probably avoided an invasion that. According to a 2006 study by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, while John F. Kennedy was campaigning in 1960 on the idea that there was a "missile gap" between the United States and Russia . The Soviet source reported that the weight of the device was 3 tons (which was in the ball park) and forecast an explosive yield of 5 kilotons. In 1991 articles, Barton Bernstein and Marc Gallicchio used this and other evidence to develop the argument that concepts of tactical nuclear weapons use first came to light at the close of World War II.[69]. The US and Japan suffered major casualties, and the American people and the president were getting tired of it. It occurred to me that a quarter of a million of the flower of our young manhood was worth a couple of Japanese cities, and I still think that they were and are. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-BT), Ground view of Nagasaki before and after the bombing; radiuses in increments of 1,000 feet from Ground Zero are shown. 35+ YEARS OF FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACTION, FOIA Advisory Committee Oversight Reports, a helpful collection of archival documents, on-line resources on the first atomic test. For on-line resources on the first atomic test. Atomic Bomb Pros 1. The British National Archives, Records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, FO 800/461. Nevertheless, his diary suggests that military hard-liners were very much in charge and that Prime Minister Suzuki was talking tough against surrender, by evoking last ditch moments in Japanese history and warning of the danger that subordinate commanders might not obey surrender orders. The target is and was always expected to be Japan., These documents have important implications for the perennial debate over whether Truman inherited assumptions from the Roosevelt administration that the bomb would be used when available or that he madethedecision to do so. and so that Russia could not enter the war to get . Moscows opening to Japan in 2015 then engendered a shift in Japan-Russia relations, as confirmed by Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrovs visit to Tokyo in April, Prime Minister Shinzo Abes bold visit to Moscow in May and Naryshkins visit to Tokyo in June 2016, right after President Obamas historical visit to Hiroshima at the end of May. If you were President Truman in 1945, would you have dropped the bomb? As he argued in this memorandum to President Truman, failure on our part to clarify our intentions on the status of the emperor will insure prolongation of the war and cost a large number of human lives. Documents like this have played a role in arguments developed by Alperovitz that Truman and his advisers had alternatives to using the bomb such as modifying unconditional surrender and that anti-Soviet considerations weighed most heavily in their thinking. RG 218, Central Decimal Files, 1943-1945, CCS 381 (6-4-45), Sec. Courtesy of Tim Brown. One of the visitors mentioned at the beginning of the entry was Iwao Yamazaki who became Minister of the Interior in the next cabinet. Groves did not mention this but around the time he wrote this the Manhattan Project had working at its far-flung installations over 125,000 people ; taking into account high labor turnover some 485,000 people worked on the project (1 out of every 250 people in the country at that time). Also relevant to Japanese thinking about surrender, the author speculated, was the Soviet attack on their forces after a declaration of war. [59a], Takashi Itoh, ed., Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 923-924 [Translation by Hikaru Tajima]. Still unaware of radiation effects, Truman emphasized the explosive yield. Unaware of the findings of Health Division scientists, Groves and Rhea saw the injuries as nothing more than good thermal burns.[75], Documents 94A-B: General Farrell Surveys the Destruction, RG 77, Tinian Files, April-December 1945, box 17, Envelope B, A month after the attacks Groves deputy, General Farrell, traveled to Japan to see for himself the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The United States, along with other countries, criticized Japanese aggression but shied away from any economic or military punishments. By contrast, Herbert P. Bix has suggested that the Japanese leadership would probably not have surrendered if the Truman administration had spelled out the status of the emperor. Was the dropping of the atomic bombs morally justifiable. For example, one of McCloys aides, Colonel Fahey, argued against modification of unconditional surrender (see Appendix C`). More updates on training missions, target selection, and conditions required for successful detonation over the target. David Holloway, Barbarossa and the Bomb: Two Cases of Soviet Intelligence in World War II, in Jonathan Haslam and Karina Urbach, eds.,Secret Intelligence in the European States System, 1918-1989(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014), 63-64. [67], National Archives, RG 165, Army Operations OPD, Executive Files 1940-1945, box 12, Exec #2. In a progress report, Bush told President Roosevelt that the bomb project was on a pilot plant basis, but not yet at the production stage. For some historians, the urban fire-bombing strategy facilitated atomic targeting by creating a new moral context, in which earlier proscriptions against intentional targeting of civilians had eroded. On August 9, 1945, another bomber was in route to Japan, only this time they were heading for Nagasaki with "Fat Man," another atomic bomb. Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard joined those scientists who sought to avoid military use of the bomb; he proposed a preliminary warning so that the United States would retain its position as a great humanitarian nation. Alperovitz cites evidence that Bard discussed his proposal with Truman who told him that he had already thoroughly examined the problem of advanced warning. [43], Barton J. Bernstein, Truman at Potsdam: His Secret Diary, Foreign Service Journal, July/August 1980, excerpts, used with authors permission.[44]. The diary entries cover July 16, 17, 18, 20, 25, 26, and 30 and include Trumans thinking about a number of issues and developments, including his reactions to Churchill and Stalin, the atomic bomb and how it should be targeted, the possible impact of the bomb and a Soviet declaration of war on Japan, and his decision to tell Stalin about the bomb. See also Malloy, A Very Pleasant Way to Die, 539-540. "Little Boy" weighed about 9,000 pounds and had a yield approximating 15,000 tons of high explosives. If it was, he believed that the bomb would be the master card in U.S. diplomacy. [19], Joseph E. Davies Papers, Library of Congress, box 17, 21 May 1945, While officials at the Pentagon continued to look closely at the problem of atomic targets, President Truman, like Stimson, was thinking about the diplomatic implications of the bomb. With Secretary of War Stimson presiding, members of the committee heard reports on a variety of Manhattan Project issues, including the stages of development of the atomic project, problems of secrecy, the possibility of informing the Soviet Union, cooperation with like-minded powers, the military impact of the bomb on Japan, and the problem of undesirable scientists. In his comments on a detonation over Japanese targets, Oppenheimer mentioned that the neutron effect would be dangerous to life for a radius of at least two-thirds of a mile, but did not mention that the radiation could cause prolonged sickness. August 4, 2015 A few months after the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, General Dwight D.Eisenhower commented during a social occasion how he had hoped that the war might have ended without our having to use the atomic bomb. This virtually unknown evidence from the diary of Robert P. Meiklejohn, an assistant to Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, published for the first time today by the National Security Archive, confirms that the future President Eisenhower had early misgivings about the first use of atomic weapons by the United States. Later that year, the Uranium Committee completed its report and OSRD Chairman Vannevar Bush reported the findings to President Roosevelt: As Bush emphasized, the U.S. findings were more conservative than those in the British MAUD report: the bomb would be somewhat less effective, would take longer to produce, and at a higher cost. For emphasis on the shock of the atomic bomb, see also Lawrence Freedman and Saki Dockrill, Hiroshima: A Strategy of Shock, in Saki Dockrill, ed.,From Pearl Harbor to Hiroshima : the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific, 1941-1945(New York, St. Martins Press, 1994), 191-214. Secretary of Commerce (and former Vice President) Henry Wallace provided a detailed report on the cabinet meeting where Truman and his advisers discussed the Japanese surrender offer, Russian moves into Manchuria, and public opinion on hard surrender terms. Furthermore, the United States demanded that the Japanese withdraw from conquered areas of China and Indochina. As the scientists had learned, a gun-type weapon based on plutonium was impossible because that element had an unexpected property: spontaneous neutron emissions would cause the weapon to fizzle.[10] For both the gun-type and the implosion weapons, a production schedule had been established and both would be available during 1945. Brown, special assistant to Secretary of State James Byrnes. As Hull explained, should we not concentrate on targets that will be of greatest assistance to an invasion rather than industry, morale, psychology, etc. Nearer the tactical use, Seaman agreed and they discussed the tactics that could be used for beach landings. After Suzuki gave the war party--Umeda, Toyoda, and Anami--an opportunity to present their arguments against accepting the Byrnes Note, he asked the emperor to speak. As Alperovitz notes, the Davies papers include variant diary entries and it is difficult to know which are the most accurate. However, the Department of the Interior opposed the disclosure of the nature of the weapon. For reviews of the controversy, see Barton J. Bernstein, The Struggle Over History: Defining the Hiroshima Narrative, ibid., 128-256, and Charles T. OReilly and William A. Rooney,The Enola Gay and The Smithsonian(Jefferson, NC: McFarland and Company, 2005). [42]. The Soviets already knew about the U.S. atomic project from espionage sources in the United States and Britain so Molotovs comment to Ambassador Harriman about the secrecy surrounding the U.S. atomic project can be taken with a grain of salt, although the Soviets were probably unaware of specific plans for nuclear use. [66], Takashi Itoh, ed., Sokichi Takagi: Nikki to Joho [Sokichi Takagi: Diary and Documents] (Tokyo, Japan: Misuzu-Shobo, 2000), 926-927 [Translation by Hikaru Tajima], As various factions in the government maneuvered on how to respond to the Byrnes note, Navy Minister Yonai and Admiral Tagaki discussed the latest developments. In these entries, Meiklejohn discussed how he and others in the Moscow Embassy learned about the bombing of Nagasaki from the OWI Bulletin. Entries for 10 and 11 August cover discussion at the Embassy about the radio broadcast announcing that Japan would surrender as long the Emperors status was not affected. Read more, The Cold War International History Project supports the full and prompt release of historical materials by governments on all sides of the Cold War. Brown recounted Byrnes debriefing of the 10 August White House meeting on the Japanese peace offer, an account which differed somewhat from that in the Stimson diary. A collectionoftranscribed documents is Gene Dannens Atomic Bomb: Decision. For a print collection of documents, see Dennis Merrill ed.,Documentary History of the Truman Presidency: Volume I: The Decision to Drop the Atomic Bomb on Japan(University Publications of America, 1995). After considerable pressure from Harriman, the Soviets signed off on the reply but not before tensions surfaced over the control of Japan--whether Moscow would have a Supreme Commander there as well. The first bomb, dropped on the city of Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, resulted in a total death toll of around 140,000. 8). A new body of scholarly work emerged, often based on hitherto unavailable documents, which countered revisionist arguments that the atomic bomb was primarily a diplomatic weapon in 1945, that Japan would have surrendered prior to the planned U.S. invasion had the bomb not been used, and that projected casualty figures for the anticipated invasion 8 devine street north haven, ct what is berth preference in irctc atomic bomb dropped to intimidate russia. Zenshiro Hoshina, a senior naval official, attended the conference and prepared a detailed account. [25] As evident from the discussion, Stimson strongly disliked de Gaulle whom he regarded as psychopathic. The conversation soon turned to the atomic bomb, with some discussion about plans to inform the Soviets but only after a successful test. For detailed background on the Army Air Forces incendiary bombing planning, see Schaffer (1985) 107-127. The record of this meeting has figured in the complex debate over the estimates of casualties stemming from a possible invasion of Japan. To keep the secret, Bush wanted to avoid a ruinous appropriations request to Congress and asked Roosevelt to ask Congress for the necessary discretionary funds. Meiklejohn recounted Harrimans visit in early October 1945 to the Frankfurt-area residence of General Dwight Eisenhower, who was finishing up his service as Commanding General, U.S. Army, European Theater. 25,000 more were injured. And the U.S. bombings hastened the Soviet Unions atomic bomb project and have fed a big-power nuclear arms race to this day. The last major battle, the fight for Okinawa, lasted almost three months and took more than 100,000 Japanese and American lives. [39], The last item discusses Japanese contacts with representatives of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in Switzerland. [58]. [4]. The reference to our contact may refer to Bank of International Settlements economist Pers Jacobbson who was in touch with Japanese representatives to the Bank as well as Gero von Gvernitz, then on the staff, but with non-official cover, of OSS station chief Allen Dulles. For Hirohito' surrender speech--the actual broadcastand a translation--seeJapan Times,August2015. President Franklin Roosevelt called the attack a day which will live in infamy, and the American people were shocked and angered. If there were, what were they and how plausible are they in retrospect? After President Roosevelt died on April 12th, 1945, it became Harry Trumans job to decide how to end the war. [11], Documents 6A-D: President Truman Learns the Secret, G 77, Commanding Generals file no. (Photo from U.S. National Archives, RG 77-BT), A photo prepared by U.S. Air Intelligence for analytical work on the destructiveness of atomic weapons. [1], Ever since the atomic bombs were exploded over Japanese cities, historians, social scientists, journalists, World War II veterans, and ordinary citizens have engaged in intense controversy about the events of August 1945. The First Nuclear Strikes and their Impact, XI. At their first meeting after the dropping of the bomb on Hiroshima, Stimson briefed Truman on the scale of the destruction, with Truman recognizing the terrible responsibility that was on his shoulders. 5, 27-35 [Translated by Toshihiro Higuchi], The Byrnes Note did not break the stalemate at the cabinet level. In light of those instructions, Togo and Prime Minister Suzuki agreed that the Supreme War Council should meet the next day. While McCloy later recalled that Truman expressed interest, he said that Secretary of State Byrnes squashed the proposal because of his opposition to any deals with Japan. Stimson did not always have Trumans ear, but historians have frequently cited his diary when he was at the Potsdam conference. Until 1949, when the USSR succeeded in testing its own bomb, the Soviet Unions knowledge of the effects of radiation was indeed very poor. The nuclear age had truly begun with the first military use of atomic weapons. [43]. As Yonai explained to Tagaki, he had also confronted naval vice Chief Takijiro Onishi to make sure that he obeyed any decision by the Emperor. [41], RG 77, MED Records, Top Secret Documents, File 5e (copy from microfilm), An elated message from Harrison to Stimson reported the success of the Trinity Test of a plutonium implosion weapon. editors,Toward a Livable World: Leo Szilard and the Crusade for Nuclear Arms Control(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), xxx-xxv; Sherwin, 210-215. For Stimsons article, see The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb,Harpers194 (February 1947): 97-107. did not mean that the war would continue. [63]. Hasegawa argues that Truman realized that the Japanese would refuse a demand for unconditional surrender without a proviso on a constitutional monarchy and that he needed Japans refusal to justify the use of the atomic bomb.[47], Clemson University Libraries, Special Collections, Clemson, SC; Mss 243, Walter J. Martin Sherwin has argued that the Franck committee shared an important assumption with Truman et al.--that an atomic attack against Japan would `shock the Russians--but drew entirely different conclusions about the import of such a shock. 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